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the	aforementioned	browsing	histories,	profiles,	individual	search	logs,	meta	data	from	many	forms	of	communications,	social	mapping	data,	geolocation	data,	transaction	records	from	online	shopping,	health	data	and	many	other	kinds	of	data.	These	are	forms	of	data	that	are	not	stories	nor,	generally,	should	be	publically	searchable,	but	which	are	critical	in	terms	of	privacy	and	autonomy.	They	are	also	precisely	the	kind	of	data	that	what	was	revealed	by	Snowden	suggests	are	being	gathered	by	the	intelligence	agencies	and	others.	Further,	there	are	two	different	ways	to	deal	with	the	data,	in	some	ways	reflected	in	the	bifurcated	name	of	the	right:	forgetting	and	erasure.	Forgetting	can	be	viewed	as	focusing	on	the	viewer/reader	of	the	data	(the	person	who	is	being	asked	to	forget)	while	erasure	focuses	on	the	data	itself	(which	is	what	needs	to	be	erased).	Forgetting	is	about	making	the	data	or	story	difficult	(or	potentially	impossible)	to	find,	while	erasure	is	about	removing	the	data	entirely.	Erasure	is	therefore	in	general	a	stronger	concept	–	because	if	data	is	genuinely	erased,	it	cannot	be	found	or	viewed.		When	these	two	dimensions	(stories	vs.	data	and	forgetting	vs.	erasure)	are	set	out	in	a	table,	four	different	scenarios	can	be	seen,	each	of	which	presents	different	problems	and	requires	different	solutions.	
Table	1	
Issues	 Type	of	data		 Stories	 Data	Forgetting		 Stories	made	hard	to	locate	 Data	made	difficult	to	gather	or	understand	
Erasure		 Stories	erased	from	the	Internet	 Data	deleted	
	Neither	the	stories-data	axis	nor	the	forgetting-erasure	axis	is	simple.	Though	all	stories	are	data,	a	story	may	exist	in	a	number	of	different	forms,	each	of	which	involves	different	data.	Accordingly,	though	erasure	is	generally	a	stronger	concept	than	forgetting,	deleting	one	form	of	story-data	will	not	necessarily	delete	the	story	itself,	even	if	that	form	is	the	‘original’	of	the	story,	if	that	story	exists	in	a	different	form.		Each	of	the	different	quarters	of	the	table	presents	a	different	problem	–	and	demands	a	different	solution,	as	shall	be	seen	below.	The	legal	and	technical	approaches	to	each	have	been	and	should	be	different.	The	issue	of	forgetting	stories,	for	example,	is	what	many	people	think	as	a	‘right	to	be	forgotten’	–	and	it	is	what	the	ruling	in	the	Google	Spain	case	relates	to,	and	is	the	first	one	to	be	addressed.	
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2.	 Google’s	response	to	the	Google	Spain	ruling	Google’s	response	to	the	Google	Spain	ruling	has	been	fast,	somewhat	surprising,	and	possible	to	read	in	a	number	of	different	ways.	As	they	describe	it	in	their	‘FAQ’	on	the	right	to	be	forgotten:	“Since	this	ruling	was	published	on	13	May	2014,	we've	been	working	around	the	clock	to	comply.”14	Google’s	immediate	response	has	a	number	of	facets.	Firstly,	they	have	provided	a	‘web	form’	for	people	who	wish	to	make	an	individual	request,	and	say	that	they	will	evaluate	each	request	individually.	In	the	month	following	the	ruling,	Google	have	said	that	they	received	around	70,000	such	requests:15	a	large	number,	but	in	the	context	of	Google’s	scale	it	is	actually	relatively	small.	In	approximately	the	same	period,	Google	received	requests	for	the	removal	of	more	than	25	million	URLs	on	the	basis	of	copyright	–	hundreds	of	times	more.16	Google	has	put	together	an	expert	‘advisory	committee’	to	negotiate	the	issues,	including	Wikipedia	cofounder	Jimmy	Wales,	Oxford	Professor	of	Information	Ethics	Luciano	Floridi,	UN	Special	Rapporteur	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	and	Expression	of	the	UNHRC	Frank	La	Rue.17	Secondly,	Google	have	added	a	note	to	the	search	results	for	any	individual	name	(other	than	a	name	of	a	public	figure)	that	‘Some	results	may	have	been	removed	under	data	protection	law	in	Europe’.	Thirdly,	Google	have	started	to	notify	people	(and	in	particular	journalists)18	that	some	links	to	their	stories	have	been	deleted.	A	number	of	things	are	apparent	from	Google’s	rapid	response	–	and	some	are	far	less	clear.	Firstly,	they	have	acted	very	fast,	faster	than	any	of	the	other	search	engines,	though	the	Google	Spain	ruling	applies	equally	to	all.	That	in	itself	could	be	significant,	as	before	the	Google	Spain	ruling	Google’s	tactics	not	just	in	this	area	but	also	in	other	dealings	with	the	European	Union	seemed	to	be	characterised	more	by	slowness	than	speed.19	Secondly,	the	blocks	that	seem	to	have	happened	do	not	look	immediately	as	though	they	fit	within	the	categories	immediately	obvious	from	the	Google	Spain	ruling:	James	Ball	in	the	Guardian	was	notified	about	stories	from	as	recently	as	2011,20	while	Robert	Peston	of	the	BBC	was	notified	about	a	story	on	as	topical	and	in	the	public	interest	subject	as																																																									14	The	FAQs	are	available	under	http://www.google.co.uk/policies/faq/.	15	Reported	for	example	at	http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/03/google-right-to-be-forgotten-law-uk-news-search-requests.		16	According	to	Google’s	transparency	report,	accessed	09.07.2014,	25,649,607	URLs	had	been	requested	to	be	removed	in	the	previous	month.	See	http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/.			17	See	https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/.		18	Notably	James	Ball	in	the	Guardian	and	Robert	Peston	of	the	BBC	–	see	footnotes	20	and	21	respectively.	19	For	example	in	their	negotiations	over	data	retention	periods	for	search	logs,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	5	of	Bernal,	Internet	privacy	rights:	rights	to	protect	autonomy,	2014.	20	See	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google.		
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change.	In	the	US	what	Snowden	uncovered	has	made	the	government	agencies	look	as	though	they	were	in	some	ways	going	against	the	ordinary	people.	As	a	consequence,	if	Google	and	others	were	not	to	be	considered	substantially	to	be	working	with	the	NSA	-	and	hence	against	ordinary	people	-	they	needed	to	show	that	they	would	work	for	those	ordinary	people,	and	resisting	the	excessive	surveillance	requirements	of	the	government	agencies.	That	has	meant	being	more	aggressive	in	their	pushes	for	'transparency',	and	against	overweening	surveillance.	Google	is	part	of	the	‘Reform	Government	Surveillance’	movement,27	for	example.	It	has	also	meant	more	of	an	embrace	of	privacy-supportive	technologies	such	as	encryption	–	for	example	in	email	connections	to	servers.28	Google	and	others	are	also	trying	to	ensure	that	people	differentiate	between	the	kinds	of	surveillance	and	potentially	privacy-invasive	practices	engaged	in	by	commercial	organisations	and	those	performed	by	the	authorities,	a	point	emphasised	by	some	of	the	privacy	advocacy	groups,	who	created	their	own	alternative	to	the	‘Reform	Government	Surveillance’	movement:	‘Reform	Corporate	Surveillance’.	As	Bruce	Schneier	explained	on	the	Reform	Corporate	Surveillance	website:	“The	NSA	didn't	wake	up	and	say,	‘Let's	just	spy	on	everybody.’	They	looked	up	and	said,	‘Wow,	corporations	are	spying	on	everybody.	Let's	get	ourselves	a	copy.’”29	It	is	difficult	to	disagree	with	Schneier.	Indeed,	this	is	the	logic	applied	by	Hogan,	J	in	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case,	which	hinges	on	the	way	that	the	Safe	Harbor	agreement	might	not	protect	data	held	by	Facebook	in	the	US	from	access	by	US	authorities.	If	the	data	were	not	being	gathered	by	the	commercial	organisations	in	the	first	place,	the	authorities	would	not	be	able	to	gain	access	to	it,	directly	or	indirectly,	through	legal	or	illegal	means.	If	people	are	to	be	protected	from	intrusion	into	their	private	lives	by	authorities,	whether	from	their	own	governments	or	others,	intrusions,	data	gathering	and	data	holding	by	commercial	organisations	need	to	be	taken	into	account.	The	referral	of	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case	to	the	CJEU	is	based	on	that	understanding	–	and	as	awareness	of	the	nuances	of	the	relationship	between	privacy	and	technology	increases,	other	courts	may	well	take	similar	views.		
3.	 Contrasting	the	Google	Spain	and	Snowden	issues	Though	there	are	similarities	and	connections	between	the	issues	that	underlie	the	concern	raised	by	Snowden	and	the	Google	Spain	case,	there	are	also	qualitative	differences.	Considering	again	the	bifurcated	nature	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	as	set	out	in	Table	1	above,	there	are	two	aspects	to	the	right:		the	'forgetting'	and	the	'erasure'.	Google	Spain	ruled	clearly	on	the	'forgetting'	element,	but	not	on	the	erasure.	When	considering	Snowden,	however,	the																																																									27	https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com.	28	See	for	example	http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/staying-at-forefront-of-email-security.html	in	response	to	the	MUSCULAR	system,	see	http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_print.html.		29	See	at	http://reformcorporatesurveillance.com.		














Solutions	 Type	of	data		 Stories	 Data	Forgetting		 Obscurity	–	and	the	right	as	suggested	in	Google	Spain	 Data	obscurity	-	stronger	encryption,	leaner	business	models,	more	distance	between	businesses	and	authorities		Erasure		 No	general	right	appropriate	–	freedom	of	expression	overrides.	 The	right	to	erasure	–	enforcing	data	minimisation	
Only	the	stories	really	engage	freedom	of	expression.	If	the	kind	of	right	set	out	in	the	Google	Spain	ruling	can	be	more	suitably	defined,	it	could	provide	an	appropriate	‘right	to	obscurity’.	Defining	it	suitably	is	a	challenge	–	but	one	that	the	data	protection	reform	process	needs	to	embrace.	In	Google	Spain,	as	many	of	the	commentators	have	pointed	out	and	to	an	extent	the	reaction	of	Google	has	highlighted,	too	much	power	is	in	the	hands	of	Google	and	the	other	search	
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engines.	Guidelines	as	to	where	the	balance	should	be	placed	between	freedom	of	expression	and	privacy	need	to	be	more	explicit	and	clearer.	What	constitutes	‘old’	and	‘irrelevant’,	for	example,	needs	to	be	discussed,	agreed	and	properly	set	out.	In	terms	of	erasure	rather	than	obscurity	of	stories,	the	balance	should	be	firmly	in	the	direction	of	freedom	of	expression	and	of	information.	The	permanent	erasure	of	a	story	quite	rightly	raises	significant	issues	of	censorship	and	the	rewriting	of	history	in	the	way	that	a	limited	form	of	obscurity	is	not.	To	establish	a	general	right	to	the	erasure	of	stories	seems	inappropriate.	There	may	be	cases	where	it	is	suitable,	but	these	will	be	very	rare	and	deserving	of	individual	consideration.	Moreover,	existing	law	such	as	the	law	of	defamation	may	well	cover	a	significant	proportion	of	those	cases	where	erasure	is	requested.	With	the	kind	of	data	for	which	freedom	of	expression	does	not	in	any	meaningful	sense	come	into	play,	the	balances	to	be	made	are	different.	Rather	than	balancing	privacy	with	freedom	of	expression,	the	balance	is	to	be	made	with	the	right	to	carry	on	a	business	–	and	from	a	human	rights	perspective	that	means	that,	in	general	and	as	acknowledged	in	the	Google	Spain	ruling,	the	right	to	a	private	life	should	remain	paramount.	In	order	to	enable	this	in	a	practical	sense,	for	obscurity	of	data	(for	example	from	government	intrusion)	the	kinds	of	moves	already	being	made	by	businesses	to	make	encryption	the	default	and	to	require	stronger	authorisation	for	government	access	is	a	starting	point.	For	proper	obscurity	this	needs	extending	to	data	sharing	between	businesses	–	and	ensuring	that	the	data	protection	reform	goes	through	in	a	robust	and	enforceable	form	is	the	key	to	this.	Ultimately,	however,	a	genuine	right	to	erasure	of	data,	where	freedom	of	expression	does	not	come	into	play,	still	appears	to	be	a	key	tool,	as	part	of	an	encouragement	and	a	possible	enforcement	for	data	minimisation.	This	kind	of	a	solution	would	address,	at	least	insofar	as	it	is	possible	to	address,	the	issue	of	maintaining	an	appropriate	balance	between	privacy	and	freedom	of	expression.	Whether	it	is	workable	is	another	question,	and	one	that	cannot	be	answered	definitively.	Google’s	implementation	attempts	so	far	have	been	clumsy	at	best	–	but	the	process	might	be	one	that	can	be	fine-tuned	into	something	practical.	Given	that	Google	deal	with	far	more	copyright	takedown	requests,	the	scale	should	not	be	insurmountable	–	and	the	speed	with	which	Google	put	the	system	in	place	suggests	that	with	more	time,	more	accuracy	could	be	attained.	With	better	guidelines	and	more	accountability,	the	seeming	increase	in	power	for	Google	would	be	reduced	–	and	it	must	be	remembered	that	to	a	great	extent	they	already	have	the	power	to	manipulate	search	results,	so	this	complaint	against	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	to	an	extent	a	straw	man.	Similarly,	the	complaint	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	reduces	Internet	freedom	is	largely	illusionary:	the	kind	of	freedom	suggested	does	not	exist	even	now.	The	influence	and	control	wielded	by	Google	themselves	and	the	mass	media	operators	who	are	some	of	the	most	vocal	opponents	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	already	means	that	this	freedom,	in	Article	10	terms,	is	not	in	the	hands	of	ordinary	people.	The	right	to	be	forgotten,	if	better	implemented,	would	primarily	mean	a	shift	in	where	the	power	and	control	is	held,	not	an	increase	in	that	power	and	control.	
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2.	 Data	Protection	Reform	All	this	leads	to	the	need	to	focus	on	data	protection	reform.	The	process	has	been	slow	so	far,	almost	tortuously	so,	but	the	combination	of	the	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden	and	the	Google	Spain	ruling	makes	that	reform	urgent.	Amongst	the	many	things	that	have	been	learned	as	a	result	of	what	Snowden	leaked,	one	of	the	most	important	is	the	inadequacy	of	the	existing	regime,	both	theoretically	and	pragmatically.	A	new,	updated	regime	is	critical,	and	it	needs	to	have	the	tools	and	the	strength	to	be	able	to	hold	the	big	commercial	Internet	companies	to	account	–	and	to	encourage	them	to	find	ways	to	provide	the	kind	of	protection	and	privacy	that	people	need.	The	apparent	emboldening	of	the	European	courts	adds	to	this	urgency,	also	both	from	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	perspective.	Both	the	declaration	of	invalidity	of	the	Data	Retention	Directive	and	the	Google	Spain	judgment	exceeded	the	expectations	of	privacy	advocates	and	indeed	the	opinions	of	the	Advocates	General.	Both	are	significant	in	their	impact	and	unequivocal	in	their	direction:	privacy	matters	not	just	to	privacy	advocates	but	to	the	courts.	This	emboldening	could	have	a	further	impact:	strengthening	the	hand	of	those	pushing	for	a	strong	new	regime.	It	also	adds	support	to	the	arguments	of	those	who	suggest	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	an	expression	of	the	basic	principles	of	data	protection,	and	hence	should	be	included	within	the	reform.	Conversely,	the	strength	and	at	the	same	time	potential	unworkability	and	burdensome	nature	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	should	add	urgency	to	the	cause	of	those	who	have	hitherto	opposed	the	existence	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	As	the	right	already	exists	–	in	a	form	particularly	burdensome	to	precisely	those	companies	who	have	been	lobbying	against	the	right	–	they	must	perform	a	volte-face.	If	they	want	to	make	the	right	more	workable	and	less	onerous,	they	must	start	pushing	for	the	reform	to	happen	sooner	rather	than	later.	From	a	practical	perspective,	the	strength	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	makes	it	seem	less	likely	than	ever	that	the	idea	of	a	right	to	be	forgotten	will	be	dropped	from	the	reform,	no	matter	how	much	lobbying	takes	place	in	the	opposite	direction.	The	question	seems	to	be	much	more	what	form	that	right	takes	and	whether	it	can	be	made	workable.	That	is	a	challenge	that	both	lawyers	and	technologists	need	to	face	up	to.	
